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Digital devices are presented several vulnerabilities because when making a connection your 
information can be compromised. Bluetooth is a means of wireless communication that allows 
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you to transfer files with distances of up to 100 meters, but its security has been seen as 
malicious users, attacking special cell phones. The Bluetooth manufacturers have improved 
their security but it has not been enough to control the vulnerabilities. The security of the 
Bluetooth connection has been directed by the manufacturers, but the user has not been able 
to carry out a control of this security.  
Keywords: Android, Attacks, Bluetooth, Security. 
 
Resumen 
Los dispositivos digitales presentan vulnerabilidades ya que al realizar una conexión su 
información puede verse comprometida. Bluetooth es un medio de comunicación inalámbrico 
muy reconocido ya que permite transferencia de archivos con distancias de hasta 100 metros, 
pero su seguridad se ha visto afectada por usuarios maliciosos, atentando en especial 
dispositivos celulares. Los fabricantes de bluetooth han mejorado su seguridad, pero no ha 
sido suficiente para controlar las vulnerabilidades. La seguridad de conexión de bluetooth ha 
sido gestionada por los fabricantes, pero el usuario final no puede llevar un control de esta 
seguridad.  
Palabras clave: Android, Ataques, Bluetooth, Seguridad. 
1. Analysis stage 
1.1. Attack Deployment  
Having identified several types of Bluetooth attacks that have existed in a system, it is possible 
to test those by pentesting. The tests performed are of the white box (tandem) type, since the 
attack environment was implemented using the Kali Linux pentesting platform, documenting 
each tool and designing the Bluetooth hacking tests.  
To get started, using Kali Linux ensure that Bluetooth is active [1] by using the following 
commands: 
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root@kali:~# service bluetooth start 
root@kali:~# service bluetooth status 
● bluetooth.service - Bluetooth service 
   Loaded: loaded (/lib/systemd/system/bluetooth.service; enabled; vendor preset 
   Active: active (running) since Sun 2018-11-11 11:35:52 -05; 5h 33min ago 
  Docs: man:bluetoothd(8) 
 Main PID: 622 (bluetoothd) 
   Status: "Running" 
 Tasks: 1 (limit: 4915) 
   Memory: 4.0M 
   CGroup: /system.slice/bluetooth.service 
        └─622 /usr/lib/bluetooth/bluetoothd 
 
The Bluetooth adapter's interface is then validated: 
root@kali:~# hciconfig 
hci0:    Type: Primary  Bus: USB 
    BD Address: C8:FF:28:A6:15:F1  ACL MTU: 820:8  SCO MTU: 255:16 
    UP RUNNING PSCAN ISCAN 
    RX bytes:3857 acl:0 sco:0 events:602 errors:0 
    TX bytes:28371 acl:0 sco:0 commands:388 errors:0 
 
It can be used the BlueLog tool which is native to Kali Linux and allows viewing and registering 
detectable devices on the Bluetooth network and runs as follows: 
root@kali:~# bluelog 
Bluelog (v1.1.2) by MS3FGX 
--------------------------- 
Autodetecting device...OK 
Opening output file: bluelog-2018-11-11-1655.log...OK 
Writing PID file: /tmp/bluelog.pid...OK 
Scan started at [11/11/18 16:55:26] on C8:FF:28:A6:15:F1. 
Hit Ctrl+C to end scan. 
 
BlueScanner is another Kali Linux tool that allows scanning through Bluetooth network adapter, 
capturing the connectivity features of the networked devices and runs as follows: 
root@kali:~# btscanner 
 
With “i” command, a network device scan is performed generating a directory with MAC address 
of the device and a file with all the collected information. 
Bluejacking Attack: To carry out the attack a contact must be created, only the name box will 
contain the message in the device’s address book that will act as an attacker saving the contact. 
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Then, an area with a large number of mobile devices is searched, the option “send via 
Bluetooth” is selected and it is sent to the target devices. 
Bluesmack Attack: It requires a command line executed directly on the attacking device's 
console, which makes a certain amount of calls in a time interval that results in a bluetooth 
service drop by the host or victim device. The script consists as follows: 
root@kali:~# while read r; do l2ping -s 50 84:C7:EA:57:36:D7; done < numscans 
 
First, a file called numscans is created with a counter from 1 to 100, to have it as a reference 
in the script and avoid memory overflow or overload in the attacking host [2]. 
root@kali:~# while read r; do l2ping -s 50 84:C7:EA:57:36:D7; done < numscans 
Ping: 84:C7:EA:57:36:D7 from C8:FF:28:A6:15:F1 (data size 50) ... 
0 bytes from 84:C7:EA:57:36:D7 id 0 time 5.91ms 
0 bytes from 84:C7:EA:57:36:D7 id 46 time 63.44ms 
Send failed: Connection reset by peer 
Ping: 84:C7:EA:57:36:D7 from C8:FF:28:A6:15:F1 (data size 50) ... 
1.2. Compilation of Attack Results 
It can be seen that the Bluetooth protocol is designed to provide interconnection facilities for 
devices and this is a necessary approach to IoT device communication, so that through the 
software solution designed it is not planned to limit or block the protocol functionality in an 
automated way by an application or service, this is relegated to the user, designing an 
application that allows the user to browse the connectivity events, paired devices and can take 
the decision to lock or not a device. 
2. Design Stage 
2.1. Software Architecture 
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Figure 1. Class diagram. 
 
Source: own. 
2.2. Iteration Diagram 
Figure 2. Application iteration diagram 
 
Source: own. 
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The diagram of the Figure 2 shows the application running on the device, engaged in different 
communications with other devices, thus the device is in a susceptible environment where it 
receives different bluetooth attacks. The device has a bluetooth interface which communicates 
with the application (BlueLock) when a bluetooth adapter is instantiated.  
The application (BlueLock), has an event filter that specifically detects changes in bluetooth 
adapter status, such as incoming connections and recording everything in the database, as well 
as in the application log.  
3. Development Stage 
3.1. Application Development 
It is proposed to develop an Android mobile application that allows to control the Bluetooth 
communication, turn on/off the controller, enable device searching, consult paired devices, 
Bluetooth event log, locked devices and access to communication feature through Bluetooth 
with Gatt Server [3].  
Application features: 
 Bluetooth user interface to control the device. 
 Bluetooth event log generation detected by the application. 
 Device locking interface through bluetooth interface. 
 Gatt Server allowing communication event detection with several devices connected 
through Bluetooth. 
 Non-relational database generation allowing the device Bluetooth connection data store 
and its related events. 
3.2. Code Documentation 
Bluetooth package filtering: The main application feature is the BroadcastReceiver function, 
which allows to receive and manage communication events sent by the bluetooth adapter in 
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Context.sendBroadcast. This function filters and controls the states detected by the application 
and writes in log these events [4-5]. 
//BroadcastReceiver 
private final BroadcastReceiver mBR = new BroadcastReceiver() { 
    @Override 
    public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) { 
        final String action = intent.getAction(); 
        String evento = ""; 
        boolean bloqueo = false; 
        final Uri uriData = intent.getData(); 
        event evt = validaUri(uriData, action); 
        eventsDBHelper dbHelper = new eventsDBHelper(getApplicationContext()); 
        String log = "", showToastLog = ""; 
        boolean logger; 
        if(action.equals(BluetoothAdapter.ACTION_STATE_CHANGED) 
                ||action.equals(BluetoothAdapter.ACTION_DISCOVERY_STARTED) 
                    ||action.equals(BluetoothAdapter.ACTION_DISCOVERY_FINISHED) 
                        ||action.equals(BluetoothAdapter.ACTION_SCAN_MODE_CHANGED)) { 
            final int estado = intent.getIntExtra(BluetoothAdapter.EXTRA_STATE, 
BluetoothAdapter.ERROR); 
            switch (estado) { 
                case BluetoothAdapter.STATE_OFF: 
                    evento = "<font color='blue'>BluetoothAdapter.STATE_OFF"; 
                    log += logAdapter(uriData,evento); 
                    break; 
                case BluetoothAdapter.STATE_ON: 
                    evento = "<font color='blue'>BluetoothAdapter.STATE_ON"; 
                    log += logAdapter(uriData,evento); 
                    break;  
 
Device connection status validation in the "Connecting" event. If the device is in a locked state 
it generates a removeBond event, which removes the paired device from the list of Bluetooth 
devices, which generates a lock at connection attempt. 
case BluetoothAdapter.STATE_CONNECTING: 
   evento = "<font color='purple'>BluetoothAdapter.STATE_CONNECTING"; 
   log += logAdapter(uriData,evento); 
   BluetoothDevice device = intent.getParcelableExtra(BluetoothDevice.EXTRA_DEVICE); 
   bloqueo = validaBloqueo(device.getAddress()); 
   UUID uuid = UUID.randomUUID(); 
   if(bloqueo){ 
       try { 
           Log.w("ACTION_ACL_CONNECTED","Entró a removeBond"); 
           Method m = device.getClass() 
                   .getMethod("removeBond", (Class[]) null); 
           m.invoke(device, (Object[]) null); 
  
Gerardo Alberto Castang-Montiel, Fernando Betancourt-Duque, Luz Adriana Peña-Salazar 
Universidad Distrital Francisco José de Caldas – Facultad Tecnológica 
 
 
           evento = "<font color='red'>Dispositivo Bloqueado ("+uuid+"): "+device.getAddress()+"; 
"+device.getName(); 
           log += logAdapter(uriData,evento); 
           showToast("Dispositivo bloqueado ("+uuid+") : "+device.getAddress()+" : "+ device.getName()); 
       } catch (Exception e) { 
           Log.w("ACTION_ACL_CONNECTED", e.getMessage()); 
           evento = "<font color='red'>Error de Dispositivo Bloqueado ("+uuid+"): 
"+device.getAddress()+"; "+device.getName(); 
       } 
       log += logAdapter(uriData,evento); 
   } 
   break; 
The next validated state is when an available device is found in the range, then we store the 
MAC and NAME of the found device, having the information of unpaired devices available in 
the application persistence. 
if(action.equals(BluetoothDevice.ACTION_FOUND)){ 
   BluetoothDevice device = intent.getParcelableExtra(BluetoothDevice.EXTRA_DEVICE); 
   int rssi = intent.getShortExtra(BluetoothDevice.EXTRA_RSSI, Short.MIN_VALUE); 
   Log.w("ACTION_ACL_CONNECTED","Entró a 
ACTION_ACL_CONNECTED"+device.getName()+"\n"+device.getAddress()+"\n"+rssi); 
   device dev = new device(); 
   dev.setId(0); 
   dev.setName(device.getName()); 
   dev.setAddress(device.getAddress()); 
   dev.setContentDesc(String.valueOf(rssi)); 
   dev.setBloqueado(String.valueOf(false)); 
   dev.setTime(String.valueOf(Calendar.getInstance().getTime())); 
   dev.setBonded(String.valueOf(false)); 
   dev.setHashCode(String.valueOf(device.hashCode())); 
   boolean result = guardaDispositivo(dev); 
   evento = "<font color='green'>BluetoothDevice.ACTION_FOUND"; 
   log += logAdapter(uriData,evento); 
   evt.setEventLog(evento); 
   dbHelper.saveEvent(evt); 
   logger = writeLog(log, "BluetoothAdapter.txt"); 
   showToastLog = "BluetoothAdapter.ACTION_FOUND"; 




Device locking: In the application it is very important the state in which the device is, therefore, 
if the application finds a device and this is active to make a connection, you can block its status 
to prevent it from performing clandestine actions to our device. The following method 
blockDevice validates the status of this device and updates the locked column [6]. 
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public boolean blockDevice(device dev){ 
    boolean result = false; 
    String estado = "bloqueado"; 
    try { 
        String args [] = new String[1]; 
        args[0] = dev.getAddress(); 
        Cursor cursor = 
this.getDevice(devicesContract.deviceEntry.tableName,null,devicesContract.deviceEntry.address+"=?
",args,null,null,null); 
        if (cursor.getCount() > 0){ 
            cursor.moveToFirst(); 
            String bloqueado = 
cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex(devicesContract.deviceEntry.bloqueado)); 
            if(bloqueado == null){ 
                estado = "bloqueado"; 
            } 
            else if(bloqueado.equals("bloqueado")) { 
                estado = "desbloqueado"; 
            } 
        }else{ 
            Log.e("deviceDBHelper", "Error bloqueando Dispositivo no emparejado:"+dev.getAddress() ); 
        } 
        ContentValues cv = new ContentValues(); 
 
4. Test Stage 
4.1. Bluejacking Attack Test 
Attack Deployment: To begin with using the BlueLock application on target device 2 with MAC 
A0:8D:16:88:A5:BD and block all devices that have Bluetooth enabled. Then it proceeds to 
create a new contact on attacker device 1 with MAC C0:8C:71:84:94:A1 and sends or shares 
it with victim device (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Bluejacking Attack - File Send Error Message. 
 
Source: own. 
Bluejacking attack result: When running the test it can be seen that the application blocks 
correctly the contact sending preventing that there will be some communication channel 
between the two devices. 
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4.2. Bluesnarfing Attack Test 
Attack deployment: Remember that this attack is similar to bluejacking, but with the difference 
that it enters and steals information from the attacked device [7-8]. Executing the same 
commands used before, the result is shown in the console: 
root@kali:~# sdptool browse --tree --l2cap C0:8C:71:84:94:A1 
Failed to connect to SDP server on C0:8C:71:84:94:A1: Connection timed out 
root@kali:~# sdptool browse --tree --l2cap C0:8C:71:84:94:A1 
Failed to connect to SDP server on C0:8C:71:84:94:A1: Operation already in progress 
root@kali:~# sdptool browse --tree --l2cap C0:8C:71:84:94:A1 
Failed to connect to SDP server on C0:8C:71:84:94:A1: Connection timed out 
root@kali:~# 
 
Bluesnarfing attack result: The victim device, having the attacker in a locked state, avoids 
service description reading and remains inaccessible to the attacking device. 
4.3. Result Analysis 
 When applying Bluejacking and Bluesnarfing attacks using BlueLock application, it gives 
a positive result, since the blocking of an attacking device did not allow to deploy the 
attack, with the Bluejacking, it does not allow notification entry with the annoying contact, 
and Bluesnarfing was completely stopped since the device tries to initiate 
communication to make some request.  
 Logging allows the user to access the validation of communication events of Bluetooth 
adapter in a range of time and to easily detect unusual events that can be performed by 
devices that are within the physical range of the Bluetooth interface [9-10]. 
5. Conclusions 
Software solutions for mobile devices focused on connection and data packet validation can 
improve Android device security in places like apartments and buildings where there are a lot 
of active Bluetooth devices therefore being more likely to be hacked. BlueLock is a connectivity 
event-oriented security application that allows detection of available devices and provides the 
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option to block unwanted ones. This is achieved by validating the status of Bluetooth interface 
through an Intent filter, which is sensitive to status changes of the Bluetooth adapter. 
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